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BROWN V. BOARD: REVISITED
Michael A. Middleton*
[Tihe Negro needs neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he
needs is Education. What he must remember is that there is no magic, either
in mixed schools or in segregated schools. A mixed school with poor and
unsympathetic teachers, with hostile public opinion, and no teaching of truth
concerning black folk, is bad. A segregated school with ignorant
placeholders, inadequate equipment, poor salaries, and wretched housing, is
equally bad. Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more
natural basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider contacts; it
inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority complex. But
other things seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and
Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer.'
As an African-American lawyer involved in the legal struggle to equalize
opportunity for all Americans during my entire professional life, I have been
troubled by the dilemma that presents itself when the ideal of integration
conflicts with the goal of enhancing educational opportunity. What is the
appropriate solution, in the context of implementing a desegregation program,
when the interest in achieving or maintaining racial balance results in a denial
of opportunity to African-American schoolchildren?2 This dilemma presents
itself in three broadly defined circumstances: 1) where a desirable and effective
educational program of limited capacity is made available on an integrated
basis; 2) where limited resources require a choice between maximizing
integration and maximizing the quality of education for African-Americans; and
3) where honest efforts to meet the educational needs of African-American
children through race-specific programs are met with resistance as
resegregative. In each of these situations, administrators and policymakers are
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, and counsel for NAACP/Caldwell plaintiffs
in Liddell v. Board of Educ., 814 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
i. W.E.B. DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. Negro Educ. 328, 335 (1935).
2. 1 recognize that there are many who would argue that an equally perplexing dilemma arises when
the goal of integration conflicts with the goal of enhancing educational opportunity for White
children. This paper will not attempt to address that question since it assumes that the goal of
eliminating unlawful segregation and, to the extent practicable, its lingering vestiges, supersedes
as a matter of law virtually all other interests inconsistent with that goal, including the interest of
majority group children in maintaining a privileged status. Enhancing educational opportunity for
minority children, however, has always been the essence of desegregation remedies.
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faced with a difficult choice between meeting the educational needs of African-
American children and complying with the integration mandate that is implicit
in current desegregation discourse.
For example, where a highly attractive program, such as a particular magnet
school, does not attract a sufficient number of White applicants to provide an
appropriate balance for the number of Black applicants, the conflict between
integration and quality education opportunities poses difficult problems. The
interest in maintaining racial balance would compel administrators to admit
only enough Blacks to "balance" the Whites admitted even if such a practice
resulted in a substantial number of seats remaining unfilled. An interest in
maximizing quality education opportunities for African-American children
would compel administrators to admit African-American applicants until all
seats were filled, even if the admission of large numbers of African-American
children resulted, through "tipping, 3 in the eventual development of an all
Black program.!
A similar dilemma is posed where limited resources force allocation
decisions. Most desegregation efforts include some transportation component.
The administrators of a program may propose to purchase a limited number of
large capacity buses to transport children for desegregation purposes. With a
smaller number of buses, longer routes will be necessary and the average ride
time for the children involved will necessarily be longer. An alternative
proposal would be to purchase a larger number of smaller buses, thereby
shortening the average ride time. The costs involved in the smaller bus
alternative would of course be higher both in terms of the initial purchase price
and long term operating costs. A focus on integration as the primary goal of the
desegregation program could lead one to the conclusion that since both options
effectively move children from a segregated setting to an integrated setting, the
less costly method should be preferred, freeing resources for other integration
promoting initiatives. A focus on the quality of education received might
compel the conclusion that the longer ride time impedes the education process
3. The "tipping point" is generally seen as that point where minority enrollment reaches a level that
results in a massive departure of Whites. Researchers set the tipping point in the general range of
30% to 40% Black. Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley, Understanding White Flight and
Doing Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 157, 165-71 (Willis D. Hawley
ed., 1981). See also Christine H. Rosell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About
the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80-94 (1983)
(summarizing research on the effects of White flight).
4. See, e.g., Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979);
Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979); Michael Heise, An Empirical and
ConstitutionalAnalysis of Racial Ceilings and Public Schools, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 921 (1993).
(Vol. 20
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to an extent that the additional expense of the smaller bus option would be
justified.
Another situation in which the dilemma presents itself is where sincere
efforts are made to create educationally innovative programs targeting particular
groups of "at risk" students.5 The integration ideal would compel a decision
against the creation of an all African-American classroom or school. The
interest in providing quality education for African-American children might
justify such targeting for legitimate sociological and pedagogical reasons.
My concern is that policymakers, lawyers, and judges, because of the
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education6 and the
confirming interpretations of that decision over the past several decades, have
a fixation on integration as the primary remedy for school segregation. It is as
if we actually believe that the damaging effects of segregation in American
education and the resultant complexities involved in educating America's
diverse youth can be corrected by the simple expedient of appropriately mixing
Black and White bodies. While no one can dispute that the ideal of integration
should be vigorously pursued, I am concerned that pursuit of that ideal, with
what appears at times to be a myopic zeal, may hamper the development of
potentially effective remedies for the lingering effects of segregation. It is also
worth noting that blind allegiance to the integration ideal over the last forty
years has accomplished relatively little in terms of achieving a truly integrated
public education system.7
When I was asked to participate in a rethinking of the Brown opinion, I saw
it as an opportunity to suggest a modification to the opinion that would have
allowed policymakers the flexibility to address the real concerns that affect the
education of African-American children. It is clear that our fixation on
integration as the solution derives from Chief Justice Warren's opinion in
Brown. In my view, while integration may well have been the best strategy to
address the concerns of the African-American community in 1954, it may not
be the best strategy in 1994 and beyond. There are circumstances in which a
blind determination to achieve integration works against the goal of improving
5. See Molefi K. Asante, The Afrocentric Idea in Education, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 170-80 (1991);
Infusion of African and African American Content in the School Curriculum, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1989 (Asa G. Hilliard, III et al. eds, 1990); Sonia R.
Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285 (1992).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Data suggests that public schools today are at least as segregated as they were in 1968. See GARY
ORFIELD & FRANKLIN MONFORT, STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE NEXT GENERATION
(1 992)QARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS
OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968 (1993). Why the integration strategy has not
accomplished an integrated public education system is a question beyond the scope of this paper.
1995]
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educational opportunity. When such is the case, policymakers should have the
flexibility to implement policies that, at the least, do no damage to the quality
of educational opportunities provided, and preferably, maximize their quality
and quantity.
I believe that the Brown opinion could have been written in a way that
would provide the necessary flexibility. I have come to this conclusion with the
inestimable benefit of hindsight; yet even with that hindsight, I cannot conclude
that Brown was wrongly decided or that its strategists were misdirected. What
I can say is that today, an inflexible allegiance to the ideal of integration that
produces an impediment to the maximization of educational opportunity for
African-American children is wrong. The Brown opinion could have been
written so as to provide the flexibility that is needed to create educationally
effective remedies for the vestiges of segregation. It is the purpose of this essay
to provide a rationale for that modification.
I. THE QUESTION
After four decades of school desegregation effort under Brown v. Board of
Education,8 American cities have become more segregated by race and income,
and public schools have continued to deteriorate. Reasonable observers of the
American educational system will readily conclude that despite Brown, our
system of education does not meet the needs of a majority of our African-
American students. Today, the majority of Black students "experience 9 to 13
years of inconsequential public education and leave school, with or without a
diploma, deficient in basic skills, marginally literate, and confined to lower
levels of employment or virtual unemployability." 9 A number of commentators
and researchers recognize the state of education for African-Americans as
troublesome, but argue that improvements in the quality of education for Blacks
and in a variety of other areas are evidence of the success of the desegregation
effort over the past forty years.'0 Others point out that the racial dimension of
8. Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
9. Hugh J. Scott, Schools for Black Males: Questions and Concerns, presented at the Daisy Bates
Educational Summit, Little Rock, Arkansas (May 9-11, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
10. See, e.g., Lamar P. Miller & J. Theodore Repa, Equity and Excellence: An Emerging Trend in the
Desegregation of Schools, presented at the Daisy Bates Educational Summit, Little Rock, Arkansas
(May 9-11, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Marshall Smith & Jennifer O'Day,
Educational Equality: 1966 and Now, in SPHERES OF JUSTICE IN EDUCATION: THE 1990 AMERICAN
EDUCATION FINANCE ASSOCIATION YEAR"OOK 53, 74 (Deborah A. Verstegen & James G. Ward eds.,
1991) (evidence of significant progress in performance over the years of Black children on reading
tests conducted by the National Assessment of Educational Progress); ROBERT L. CRAIN & RITA E.
[Vol. 20
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desegregation accounts for only a portion of the positive results found, and that
the economic level of the students in attendance plays an important part in
individual student performance." Others, while acknowledging limited success
in achieving a degree of improvement in several areas, point to the loss in the
Black community of many high quality Black schools, the isolation,
insensitivity, and rejection that many Black students experience in White
dominated school settings, and the lack of significant gains in the tested
academic achievement of Black students as evidence of the failure of the
desegregation effort) 2
MAHARD, DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT RAISE BLACK ACHIEVEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
35-45 (1982) (rise in tested achievement scores and in I.Q. scores in desegregated schools); ROBERT
L. CRAIN & JACK STRAUSS, CENTER FOR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SCHOOLS, THE JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENTS: RESULTS FROM
A LONG-TERM EXPERIMENT (1985) (students who experienced desegregated education more likely
to work in private sector White-collar and professional jobs, while those in segregated schools more
likely to work in government and blue-collar jobs). See also, James McPartland & JoMills
Braddock, Going to Colleges and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 141, 146, 150 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981); James McPartland,
Desegregation and Equity in Higher Education and Employment: Is Progress Related to the
Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools?, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 110-13,
124, 131 (1978) (students who attend desegregated schools more likely to attend college, complete
more years of college, and have better jobs); James S. Liebman, Desegregation Politics: "All-Out"
School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990) (among African-American
children attending desegregated schools the likelihood of teenage pregnancy, dropping out, and
delinquent behavior is substantially lower than among African-American children in segregated
schools); Jomills Henry Braddock et al., A Long Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent
Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259, 260 (1984) (Blacks and Whites who
attended integrated schools more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods and have personal
relationships with persons of the other race than those who attended segregated schools).
I1. William L. Taylor, The Continuing Struggle of Equal Educational Opportunity, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1693 (1993) (research indicates that disadvantaged children fare better in schools and classrooms
comprised largely of advantaged students than when isolated with others of the same background).
See also ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 142-43 (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P.
Moynihan eds., 1972); OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21-33
(1966) (the Coleman report); U.S. COMMISSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 72-124 (1967); PHILLIP BURCH, THE DROPOtr PROBLEM IN NEW JERSEY'S BIG URBAN
SCHOOLS: EDUCATIONAL INEQUALrrY AND GOVERNMENT INACTION (1992); Gary Orfield & Lawrence
Peskin, Metropolitan High Schools: Income, Race, and Inequality, in EDUCATION POLITICS FOR THE
NEW CENTURY (Douglas E. Mitchell & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 1991); DOUG MACIVER & JOYCE
EPSTEIN, How Equal are Opportunities for Learning in Disadvantaged and Advantaged Middle
Grades Schools? in THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON EFFECTIVE
SCHOOLING FOR DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS, Report 7 (1990).
12. Derrick Bell, Heretical Thoughts on a Serious Occasion, presented at the Daisy Bates Summit,
(1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). See also RAYMOND C. RiST, THE INVISIBLE
CHILDREN: SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1978); JACQUELINE JORDAN IRVINE, BLACK
STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PRESCRIPTIONS (1990); Serge Madhere,
Self Esteem of African American Preadolescents: Theoretical and Practical Considerations, 60 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 48 (1991).
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There is general agreement on at least two points with regard to our forty
year school desegregation effort-the racially integrated school systems we
sought have not been produced to the extent hoped, and the equal educational
opportunities envisaged by the architects of the Brown strategy have not been
realized. There are those who argue that the desegregation effort has failed to
achieve either racial balance or educational equity for Black children, and
therefore the effort should be re-focused on enhancing the quality of education
provided in Black schools. 13 Others argue that the racial balance approach has
not been given the time or the resources to achieve full success, and that the
effort to integrate America's education system should be significantly
enhanced. 4 There are arguments offering educational voucher systems as a
means of improving public schooling, 15 and "controlled choice" plans as a
means of both enhancing the quality of education and fostering desegregation.' 6
There are suggestions that multiculturalism is the appropriate focus for the
effective education of all Americans. 17 Others offer afrocentrism as a strategy
for enhancing the academic achievement of African-American students. 18
There have been efforts to establish publicly supported all-Black, or even all-
Black-male schools as a means of enhancing the chances of success for these
currently "at risk" individuals. 19
13. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 487 (1976).
14. See Scott, supra note 9. See also Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools, Equal Protection,
The New Separatism and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1993).
15. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990).
16. Charles V. Willie, Controlled Choice: An Alternative Desegregation Plan for Minorities Who Feel
Betrayed, presented at the Daisy Bates Summit (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author);
Eileen M. Fava, Note, Desegregation and Parental Choice in Public Schooling: A Legal Analysis
of Controlled Choice Student Assignment Plans, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 83 (1991); Stephen
Eisdorfer, Public School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L. Rev. 937 (1993);
Michael J. Alves & Charles V. Willie, Choice, Decentralization, and Desegregation: The Boston
Controlled Choice Plan, 2 CHOICE& CONTROL 17 (1990); Michael J. Alves & Charles V. Willie,
Controlled Choice Assignments: A New and More Effective Approach to School Desegregation, 19
URB. REv. 65 (1987).
17. See, e.g., James A. Banks, Race, Ethnicity and Schooling in the United States: Past, Present and
Future, in MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION IN WESTERN SociETIEs 30 (James A. Banks & James Lynch
eds., 1986).
18. See supra note 5.
19. Roberta Steel, All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate Schools, 43 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 591 (1993); Christopher Steskal, Creating Space for Racial Difference: The Case for
African-American Schools, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187 (1992); Pamela J. Smith, All-Male
Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L.
REv. 2003 (1992); Kevin Brown, A Reply to Cummings: Are the Racial Realists Forced to Embrace
the Legal Rationale of the Liberal and Integrationist Structures?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 783
(1993); Hugh J. Scott, Schools for Black Males: Questions and Concerns, presented at the Daisy
Bates Summit (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Of course, the establishment
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Some of our greatest minds have been grappling with this dilemma for as
long as there have been free Blacks in America. 2° Even during the development
of the strategy for pursuing the school desegregation effort in the early 1950s,
it was not universally agreed that integration was a more appropriate solution
than equalization. As Jack Greenberg, former Director-Counsel of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, noted,
In some of the school cases, plaintiffs and the local NAACP had come to us
because they wanted to integrate. In others, the impetus stemmed from a
desire to equalize badly inferior buildings or get transportation where Whites
rode to nearby schools and Blacks walked or were bused past the White
school to far-off Black schools."
As Judge Robert L. Carter noted, "[w]hile we fashioned Brown on the theory
that equal education and integrated education were one in the same, the goal
was not integration but equal educational opportunity. '22 In the early 1980s,23
and even today, the debate continues.
of racially identifiable schools looks very much like the wrong that was outlawed in Brown, and
critics have questioned whether the call for a diminishment in focus on racial integration and a
concern for enhancing the quality of education provided to Black children is a "return to Plessy v.
Ferguson. " See, e.g., Miller & Repa, Equity and Excellence: An Emerging Trend in the
Desegregation of Schools, presented at the Daisy Bates Summit (1991) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author). Even though I have at times resorted to such hyperbolic advocacy, I recognize that
there is a difference between the state mandated "separate but equal" allowed in Plessy and state
sponsored race conscious programs narrowly tailored to achieve compelling governmental goals.
See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616 (1987). Racial separatism may under appropriate circumstances serve as a positive
empowerment for people of color. See Frederick Hord, African Americans: Cultural Pluralism and
the Politics of Culture, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 1047 (1989); T. Alexander Aleinekoff, A Case for Race
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991). Under inappropriate circumstances, however, it
is unconscionable. The danger of course is in who decides, and how it is decided, that any particular
circumstance is appropriate.
20. For a review of our historically shifting attitude on this separation/integration quandary, see Derrick
A. Bell, Chapter 7 in RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980).
21. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 118 (1994).
22. ROBERT L. CARTER, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward into the
Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 623 (1979) ("TIThe basic postulate of our strategy and
theory in Brown was that the elimination of enforced, segregated education would necessarily result
in equal education."); ROBERT L. CARTER, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 21 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
23. See SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
1995]
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II. BROWN'S ANSWER
In Brown, the Supreme Court declared that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. ' '24 One year later, in Brown II,25 the court ordered that
dejure segregated schools be desegregated "with all deliberate speed."26 After
thirteen years of inactivity, ineffective activity, and obvious obstruction,27 the
Court in Green v. School Board of New Kent County 28 charged all school
districts in non-compliance with Brown29 with an affirmative duty to develop
plans "necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch., 30  Green, while establishing "unitary
status" as the goal of the desegregation effort, failed to provide any clear
measure for determining how or when unitary status would be achieved.3'
Since Green, courts that have been faced with the question of how to
identify the successful end of a desegregation effort have answered it quite
differently.32 The Supreme Court's effort to answer the question has focused
primarily on the extent to which an acceptable level of racial balance has been
achieved.33 The Court's focus on racial balance is understandable in light of the
24. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
26. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.
27. See, e.g., Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (county school
system was closed for four years to avoid desegregation; public funds were used to support White
private schools).
28. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
29. Schools that failed to comply with Brown were those that continued to operate "dual systems," the
indicia of which were found to be, inter alia, segregation among students, faculty, and staff;
segregation of transportation; and segregation of extracurricular activities and facilities. Id. at 435.
30. Id. at 437-38.
31. Id. at435.
32. United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987) (districts that have rid themselves of all
vestiges of past discrimination); Pitts & Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (districts
that have maintained at least three years of racial equality in the six enumerated Green categories);
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989) (any district currently having
desegregated student assignments); Georgia State Conference v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir.
1985) (distinguishing between a "unitary school district" and a district which has achieved "unitary
status").
33. The Supreme Court has consistently discussed school desegregation in terms of the Green factors;
that is, the extent to which a system has met its affirmative duty to desegregate in six critical areas.
See supra note 29. In Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991), the Court addressed
the question in terms of "whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to
the extent practicable." The Dowell Court made specific reference to the Green factors as those
facets of school operations that must be scrutinized. It was not until the Court's decision in Freeman
v. Pitts, that it recognized that quality of education was also a legitimate concern. Freeman v. Pitts,
112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992). Most recently, the Court heard argument in Missouri v. Jenkins, 115
[Vol. 20
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holding in Brown that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place,"'34 and the fact that the most visible and obvious vestige
of segregation is the physical separation of Black and White children in school.
The declaration that separate was inherently unequal and the requirement
that all students receive the same educational opportunity by eliminating
differences in schools based on race may have been a reasonable solution in
1954. As of today, however, we know that integration has not been
accomplished to the degree anticipated,35 and even where achieved, the
evidence suggests that integrated education is often problematic.36 In most large
urban areas, demographics render integration of student bodies in all schools
virtually impossible. Even where physical integration is achievable in a school
building, social integration has proved elusive and physical segregation within
the building has become the commonplace.37
In light of the initial goal of the desegregation effort, to improve the
educational opportunities for Black children,38 the more critical contemporary
issue is not in determining how much integration is enough, but what
"desegregation" activity is truly in the best interest of African-American school
children, the intended beneficiaries of the effort. W.E.B. DuBois set what I
consider the appropriate tone for this debate in the epigram to this essay-Black
children need "neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What [they need]
is Education.,
39
The goal of this essay is to explain, with the benefit of our experience and
current knowledge, the basis for a revision of the Brown opinion. In
approaching this task, four factors influence my thinking. First, there is the
S. Ct. 2038 (1995), to address the appropriateness of utilizing measures of academic achievement
in determining the success of desegregation efforts. The district court below, monitoring the
implementation of its desegregation decrees, had ordered continued funding of"quality education
programs" in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District (KCMSD). Id. at 2042. The Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed by stating that "[t]he success of quality of education
programs must be measured by their effect on the students, particularly those who have been the
victims of segregation. It will take time to remedy the systemwide reduction in student achievement
in the KCMSD schools." Jenkins v. Missouri, II F.3d 755, 766 (8th Cir. 1993).
34. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
35. See supra note 7.
36. See, e.g., JACQULINE J. ERVINE, BLACK STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND
PRESCRIPTIONS (1990).
37. Kimberly C. West, A Desegregation Tool that Backfired Magnet Schools and Classroom
Segregation, 103 YALE L.J. 2567 (1969); JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THENEW AMERICAN DILEMMA:
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 21 (1984); EVA W. CHUNN, SORTING BLACK
STUDENTS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE: THE INEQUITY OF ABILITY GROUPING AND TRACKING (Willy
D. Smith & Eva W. Chunn eds., 1989).
38. CARTER, supra note 22.
39. See DuBois, supra note 1, at 328.
1995]
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consistent criticism of Chief Justice Warren's opinion as based not on neutral
constitutional principles but on contestable social science data.4o Second, there
is the concern that the remedy that grew out of the Brown decision replicates the
wrong in that it stigmatizes African-Americans as second class citizens.4 '
Third, there is the concern that the effort to enforce the Brown mandate has
been unsuccessful in enhancing the academic achievement or life chances of
African-American children.42 Finally, there is my personal reluctance to
challenge in any significant way the monumental accomplishment of the
brilliant lawyers, scholars, and activists who have inspired me through my
professional life. I believe that Brown v. Board of Education could have been
decided in a way that would satisfy at least the first two concerns, while at the
same time providing the flexibility necessary for the exploration of a variety of
approaches to solving the problems of educating an economically and racially
diverse American population in the late 20th and early 21st century.
As written, the Brown opinion rendered inconsequential the tangible
differences between Black and White education under segregation and
grounded its finding of an equal protection violation in the fact of segregation
and its presumed harm to African-American children. To support its finding of
harm to African-American children, the Court relied on evidence of the
psychological effects of segregation. The use of that data has served as the
focal point for criticism of the Court's decision as not based on neutral
principles of constitutional analysis. That same data has also resulted in a
branding by the Court of the African-American children subjected to segregated
education as perhaps being permanently damaged. 3
Focusing not on the harm of segregation so much as the fact of segregation
based on an unjustifiable racial classification would both eliminate the
stigmatizing of Black children as being damaged, and provide a neutral
principle upon which the equal protection violation could have been based.
Recognizing the tangible differences that existed between the Black and White
education systems extant at the time and the relative inadequacy of the Black
system to meet the educational needs of its students, would have provided a
basis for a broader array of potentially effective remedial approaches than could
be justified under the racial balance approach adopted in Brown.
40. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
41. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for DeJure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. I (1992).
42. See, e.g., Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or
Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 108 (Derrick Bell
ed., 1980); Derrick Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW.
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 124 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
43. See infra notes 40, 44-45.
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The modifications that I propose do not challenge in any significant way the
work of the Brown strategists. They do recognize, however, that the goal of the
desegregation strategy was not to achieve integration for the sake of integration,
but for the sake of improving educational opportunities for African-American
children. With the modifications I propose, segregation as it existed in 1954
would remain unconstitutional. The remedy for that segregation, however, is
not primarily integration, and integration is not the primary goal of the remedy.
Integration is merely one of many components of a remedial scheme designed
to enable school systems to serve equally the needs of all students.
11. SEGREGATION'S HARM
The Brown opinion is grounded in the notion that segregation inflicted
harm on African-Americans. The harm identified by the Court included
psychological harm44 and educational harm. 45 Commentators have advanced
several other theories of harm that could have justified the Brown remedy.
These theories generally include stigmatic harm,46 corruption of the political
process, 47 denial of associational rights 8 and invidious value inculcation.9
None of these theories fully describes the damage done by segregation in public
44. "[T]o separate [African-American children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
45. "A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.
Kan. 1951)). More recently, advocates have argued that segregation also produces educational
deficits in majority group children as well. See Jenkins v. Missouri, II F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1994).
46. Stigmatic harm is the insult or offense to African-Americans resulting from the labeling of them as
inferior that public school segregation entails. See Charles R. Lawrence, One More River to Cross,
in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECrIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 48 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
47. This theory states that corruption of government processes is caused by decisionmaking based on
racial prejudice. See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The
Consequences of Uncertainty, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (Ray
C. Rist & Ronald J. Anson eds., 1977).
48. The notion that Brown was grounded in protecting the right of African-Americans to associate with
Whites was raised and rejected by Professor Wechsler. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959).
49. Some commentators believe that the harm of segregation was that it resulted in a public school
system designed to inculcate a belief in the inferiority of African-Americans. See, Kevin Brown,
Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the
Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105 (1990).
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 20 S. Ill. U. L. J.  29 1995-1996
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
schools and none alone justifies a remedial scheme that could repair that
damage.
The educational plight of African-American children cannot be attributed
to their segregation in the public schools alone, just as it cannot be attributed
alone to discrimination in housing, employment, access to political power, or
the many other places in American life where racism and other vestiges of
slavery appear. As the Court noted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education:0
We are concerned ... not with the myriad factors of human existence which
cause discrimination in a multitude of ways .... The elimination of racial
discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that should not be
retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction
of school authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of
baggage.3 '
Recognizing the limited impact that judicial action in the public schools can
have in improving the general condition of African-American citizens or the
educational condition of their children, and recognizing the need to limit the
scope of constitutional remedies to the constitutional wrongs found, the Court
in Brown could have increased its baggage-carrying capacity and created the
opportunity for far greater flexibility in future remedial action had it refocused
its finding of harm and recognized the need for action on a broader scale.
It is generally understood among commentators that there are two basic
models of civil adjudication in the American system of justice.52 The traditional
dispute resolution model has as a defining feature the concept that right and
remedy are interdependent. The scope of the remedy under this model is
derived from the substantive violation, and compensation is in proportion to the
harm done. Under the dispute resolution model, the party structure is bipolar-a
contest between at least two unitary interests. 53 The public law litigation
model, on the other hand, is characterized by an amorphous party structure, and
relief is forward-looking and not logically derived from the substantive harm
done, but broad, flexible, and policy oriented.54
50. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
51. Id. at 22.
52. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). See also
Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990); Girardeau A. Spann, Expository
Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1983).
53. Chayes, supra note 57, at 1282.
54. Chayes, supra note 57, at 1302.
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While Chief Justice Warren seemed to be engaged in dispensing classic
expository justice under the public litigation model, he also seemed to be bound
to a traditional dispute resolution model of adjudication.55 The opinion
approaches the questions presented with a clear concern for identifying tangible
harms to the plaintiffs that could be made right by judicial decree. Perhaps the
Chief Justice was drawn into this method of analysis by a need to respond to
Justice Brown's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,56 finding that segregation
produced no harm to African-Americans. 57 Perhaps the Court saw a need to
dramatize the harm done to the plaintiff children in order to generate sufficient
feelings of collective national guilt to pull together the political consensus it
viewed as necessary to make the decision as palatable as possible to the
American public. Perhaps the Court was truly convinced by the social science
testimony offered by plaintiffs.58 Perhaps the Court wished to limit the impact
of its decision only to the public schools, and thereby avoid the appearance of
effecting segregation in other aspects of American life. Whatever the reason
(more likely, all of these factors played a part in shaping the Court's opinion),
the Court's concern for establishing the harm of segregation seems to have
structured its description of the constitutional wrong, and consequently, its
construction of a remedy. Unfortunately, the remedy it constructed had only
minimal success in either providing integrated educational experiences for, or
improving the quality of education available to, African-American children.
Moreover, the Court's approach has served to perpetuate the myth of Black
inferiority and to detract from a potentially more effective remedial focus. Of
course, the exclusive adoption of any one of the many theories of harm
advanced since Brown would carry similar limitations, in that the remedy
designed to address the harm found would likely be minimally effective because
of its narrowness.
An approach to resolution of the school cases that would have offered
greater potential for equalizing educational opportunity for Black children
55. While I seem to criticize Justice Warren for not fully embracing the "public law" model, I recognize
that his Brown opinion is what prompted the scholarly movement recognizing the "public law"
litigation model. The Brown Court can hardly be faulted for failing to apply fully a model of
adjudication that had not yet been fully articulated.
56. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
57. Plessy had rejected the notion that segregation was harmful to African-Americans, stating that
"enforced segregation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority... not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
58. The social science testimony was almost immediately subjected to serious criticism. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 355-56 (1976). See also Note, Grade School Segregation: The Latest
Attack on Racial Discrimination, 61 YALE L.J. 730 (1952); EARNEST VAN DEN HAAG & RALPH Ross,
THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY (1957).
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would have been for the Court to focus more clearly on its role as a dispenser
of expository justice. Had the Court embraced in these cases its function of
giving positive meaning to the values expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not viewed itself as resolving a dispute by identifying harm and devising
a compensatory remedy, it could have avoided the criticism it has been
subjected to for both relying on social science data rather than on neutral
principles,59 and for re-victimizing the primary victims of segregation. 6°
Moreover, by identifying the violation without reference to the damage
purportedly done by segregation to Black children, the Court could have
recognized the significant damage actually done, and established a basis for a
broader array of remedial approaches. This is not to say that segregation did no
harm. The harm, however, was not that segregation, in and of itself, somehow
damaged the psyches of Black children in ways likely never to be undone,6 nor
that it retarded their educational and mental development. 62 The harm done
under segregation, as it existed in 1954, was that Black children were provided
an inferior educational opportunity in three major ways. First, the educational
opportunity offered Black children was diminished by virtue of the severe
underfunding and undervaluing of the schools to which they were relegated.
Second, the education system was unresponsive to the educational needs of
Black children that were a product of the unique place in American culture that
they occupied as a result of slavery, segregation, and racism. Lastly, all
children were denied the better educational opportunity that presumptively
exists in a setting where children can interact and learn in a pluralistic, non-
59. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
60. Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the
Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV.I (1992). As an African-American who received his early education
in the segregated Black schools of Jackson, Mississippi, in the 1950s, I have always been offended
reading the personally insulting words of the Court that "segregation... has a tendency to (retard)
the educational and mental development of Negro children." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954).
61. There is some dispute over the psychological effects of segregation. See Edgar Epps, Minority
Children: Desegregation, Self Evaluation, and Achievement Orientation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 85 (W. Hawley ed., 198 1); Stuart Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation:
Did We Mislead the Supreme Court? 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 420 (1979); Nancy
H. St. John, The Effects of School Desegregation on Children: A New Look at the Research
Evidence, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 84 (1981). See also Kevin Brown, Do African-
Americans Need Public Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by the Legal
Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REv. 813 (1993); Sara L. Lightfoot,
Families As Educators: The Forgotten People of Brown, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 2-17 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
62. There is evidence that African-American children can learn in an all Black setting. See, e.g.,
THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES 259-63 (1972); U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC.,
SCHOOLS THAT WORK: EDUCATING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN 17 (1987).
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racial setting. Recognizing the harm of segregation in these terms rather than
in terms of damage to a particular set of plaintiffs would have allowed the Court
to construct more flexible and meaningful remedies.
IV. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
The Warren court was wise not to rely solely on the inferior resources that
had consistently been provided to Black schools as the basis for its finding of
inequality. A finding of inequality only in the allocation of resources might, in
the long run, justify as a remedy only the redistribution of resources. An
exclusively redistributionist remedy would leave available to recalcitrant judges
and public officials the discretion to find equality where it clearly did not exist,
as had been the case under Plessy. At the time of the Brown decision, the
efficacy of this approach had been debated in the Black community for over one
hundred years, and the conventional wisdom was that integration was the way
to ensure that Africa-American children could be assured of equal educational
opportunity.63 In the view of the Brown strategists, and apparently the Court,
a simple redistribution of resources could not eliminate the adverse
psychological and developmental effects of the then segregated schools. The
question, whether an end to segregation could either eliminate those effects or
achieve the ultimate goal, equal educational opportunity, 6' appears to have
either been assumed to be answered in the affirmative or lost in the shuffle.
I believe that a more direct and effective approach would have been for the
Court to have fully embraced its expository function and grounded its decision
in the notion that state-imposed segregation of the races violated the equal
protection of the law mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment 65 even without
regard for the unequal allocation of public resources or the harm done to Black
children. While a reading of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment may not
clearly evidence the intent of its ratifiers with regard to the effect of the
amendment on extant segregated schools, it could have been made clear in
Brown that the general language used, "equal protection," is broad enough to
63. See, JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 118-20 (1994).
64. Id. at 118. Greenberg cites Judge Robert Carter's recollection of the period:
I believe that the majority sentiment in the Black community was a desire to secure
for blacks all of the educational nurturing available to whites. If ending segregation
was the way to that objective, fine; if, on the other hand, securing equal facilities
was the way, that too was fine.
Id.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 20 S. Ill. U. L. J.  33 1995-1996
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
be reasonably construed as prohibiting state enforced racial segregation in
public schools, Plessy notwithstanding. The neutral principle relied on under
this analysis is that the use by government of a racial classification without a
compelling governmental interest constitutes the violation.66 The mere
existence of state-supported segregation of the races was enough to find the
constitutional violation and effect a remedy of unsegregation.67 The fact that
the purpose of segregation was "to stigmatize and subordinate" a class of people
on the basis of race makes the absence of any legitimate government purpose
clear. Had the Court relied on the simple fact of unjustified state-supported
segregation as the basis for its finding, it could also have avoided the insult to
the African-American community that its questionable findings of
psychological and developmental damage entail.69
Beyond the equal protection violation found as a result of the existence of
unjustified state supported segregation, the Court could have found on the facts
presented in the cases before it, and as a matter of historical fact, that the
segregated schools that served the educational needs of the Black community
were generally not only insufficiently funded, and therefore unequal by all
objective measures,70 but also oriented on a model that perpetuated the
66. My colleagues at this conference addressed as a question of constitutional interpretation whether
there was a legitimate constitutional underpinning for the Brown decision. Professor Perry
concluded that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been
a more supportive basis for the decision. Professor Kelley found that racial segregation in the public
schools would violate both the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses. Professor
Maltz finds nothing in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment that would preclude a state from
mandating segregation of the races in its public schools. My concern here is that whatever
constitutional basis we settle on to justify our conclusion that the racial segregation practiced in
public schools as of 1954 was unconstitutional, we understand the need for developing effective
remedies for the real harm done. There was ample support for the position that such segregation
violated equal protection at the time of Brown. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879);
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). For the purposes of this paper, I see no reason
to challenge that conclusion. Even our noted contemporary originallist, Professor Bork, suggests
that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment supports a finding of an equal
protection violation in the case of segregated schools. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE PoLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 76-82 (1990).
67. The term "unsegregation" is used to distinguish this remedy from "desegregation," which has
acquired a variety of meanings. By unsegregate, I mean to cease using race as the sole factor in
making school assignment decisions.
68. Charles R. Lawrence, "One More River to Cross "-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A
Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 51 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
69. See supra notes 57, 59-60.
70. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, 9What Is Left To Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to Minimally
Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLErE, J. 99 (1991) (Black schools were insufficiently funded,
staffed by less qualified teachers than those used in White schools, offered a narrower curriculum
[Vol. 20
HeinOnline  -- 20 S. Ill. U. L. J.  34 1995-1996
Symposium
messages of Black inferiority and White superiority.7 These tangible
deficiencies in the education system that were integral components of the
segregation practiced at that time bolster the segregation violation and may
constitute an additional equal protection violation in that the system, as
operated, failed equally to address the educational needs of African-American
children, thus denying them an equal educational opportunity. It was not that
the message of white supremacy had been internalized by Black victims to their
psychological and emotional detriment, nor was it that segregation denied
associational rights, corrupted the political process, or inculcated invidious
values that constituted the equal protection violation. It was both that the racial
classification could not be justified and that an educational system oriented on
such a morally and factually deficient world view as white supremacy was
wholly inappropriate and ineffective-particularly for the education of African-
American children. 2 The system of education at issue in Brown failed to
accommodate equally the educational needs of African-American and White
children.
V. REMEDIES
Unlike the original Brown opinion, which justified a remedial focus only
on unsegregating the races in public schools, the finding proposed here would
call for a remedy that transcends the racial dimension and addresses the
educational disparities that exist in American schools as a result of segregation
as practiced before Brown. By requiring schools that serve African-American
children to meet their educational needs on a basis equal to that to which White
children's needs are met, the Court could have required education providers to
address more specifically and effectively the uniquely different situations in
which Black and White children found themselves as a result of segregation.
than that of predominately White schools. See Gebhart v. Belton, 87 A.2d 862, 868 (Del. Ch. 1952);
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp 337 (E.D.Va. 1952); Briggs
v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp 29 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
71. "IThe fundamental vice was not legally enforced racial segregation itself;... this was a mere by-
product, a symptom of the greater and more pernicious disease-white supremacy." Robert L. Carter,
A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROwN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 23 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
72. It seems clear that such a system is ineffective and inappropriate for the education of White children
as well. The argument could therefore be made that so long as the system is equally ineffective and
inappropriate, there is no equal protection violation. I doubt that many would seriously contend,
however, particularly in light of the resource allocation inequities and the clear purposes of
segregation, that Blacks and Whites were equally disadvantaged under segregation as it existed at
the time of Brown.
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Far more important than requiring that the same educational opportunity be
provided to Black and White children is that each group receive educational
programs that work for them. It is true that since the Supreme Court's decision
in Milliken J1,73 the possibility that a court could order the kind of relief that
would clearly be justified under my revision of Brown is enhanced. Despite its
broadening of available potential remedies, the Court's decision in Milliken II,
because it provided what appeared to be an alternative to integration, was
viewed by many proponents of equal educational opportunity for African-
Americans as a major setback.74 Consequently, even after Milliken II, remedial
and compensatory educational programs were largely thought of as ancillary to
the primary goal of eliminating segregation, and were justified either on the
basis that they were a useful tool for encouraging integration75 or as an
alternative to the preferred remedy of integration where integration was not
feasible.76
My shift in focus for Brown sets a tone that provides to those responsible
for designing remedies for segregation the flexibility to reach beyond mere
integration as the solution. Indeed, this shift in focus provides positive
constitutional support for many of the race specific programs now advanced by
some educators. Moreover, it calls for remedies that work to accomplish the
original goal of the Brown strategists, to provide equal educational opportunity
for African-American children.77
Measuring the extent to which each group is provided equal educational
opportunity must go beyond. both a simple assessment of the extent to which
they are integrated and a simple comparison of resources expended; instead, that
73. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
74. See, Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles
and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 570-71 (1975)
(suggesting that the Court had chosen a "fork in the road" leading "away from desegregation and
away from equal educational opportunity for Black children"); Wallace D. Loh, In Quest of Brown s
Promise: Social Research and Social Values in School Desegregation, Book Review of Trial and
Error: The Detroit School Segregation Case by Eleanor Wolf 58 WASH. L. REv. 129, 130 (1982)
("Milliken is the first major set-back for integration since Brown and may signal the start of a
modem version of Plessy: mostly-separate-but-equal.").
75. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1983).
76. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291-92 (1977) (Milliken I1) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[Tihat a program of remediation is necessary to supplement the primary remedy of pupil
reassignment is inevitable."); Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 688 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("The
elimination of the vestiges of segregation ... is ancillary to and separate from the primary goal of
eliminating the segregation itself." (emphasis omitted)); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 731 F.2d 1294,
1314 (8th Cir. 1984) ("When no other feasible desegregation techniques exist, then specific remedial
programs for students in the remaining one-race schools may be included as a means of ensuring
equal educational opportunity.").
77. See supra note 22.
[Vol. 20
HeinOnline  -- 20 S. Ill. U. L. J.  36 1995-1996
Symposium
assessment must be made on the basis of outcomes, the extent to which the
educational needs of African-American children are met by the school system.78
VI. CONCLUSION
The Brown Court was correct in finding an equal protection violation based
on the segregation of public schools as practiced in 1954. The decision can be
supported purely on the basis that the racial classification involved, that is, with
the purpose and effect of subordinating a class of people on the basis of race,
could not be justified as promoting any legitimate governmental interest. The
Court, however, apparently feeling a need to identify a tangible harm to
underlie its finding, accepted questionable evidence of long term psychological
and educational damage to the African-American children exposed to
segregation. The problem is that the Court, in identifying the harm to the
children, neglected to recognize that if African-American children had been
harmed by segregation, it was likely that segregation in and of itself was not the
sole cause of the observed "damage." Rather, it seems clear in hindsight that
any educational deficit that might have been observed in African-American
children was caused by the unequal educational opportunities afforded them
through the systematic underfunding of the schools to which they were
relegated, and through curricula designed and implemented in an apartheid-like
social context of White domination and Black subjugation.79
In focusing on segregation as the cause of the harm and ignoring the
subordination of the educational needs of Black children, the Court fixed on
desegregation, or integration, as the appropriate remedy. In doing so, the Court
missed an opportunity to develop potentially more effective remedies targeting
the specific educational needs of African-American children. Recognizing the
inequality in physical facilities, curricular material, and other tangible factors
in the schools provided for Black children as an integral part of the
constitutional violation would have allowed for an additional remedial focus on
educational innovations designed to improve the quality of education provided
78. The question whether educational outcomes are relevant factors in judging the effectiveness of
desegregation remedies was, at the time of this essay, before the Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2058(1995). Obviously, under my approach accurate measures of educational
outcomes are essential in assessing whether the educational needs of each group are equally met.
The problems associated with determining which measures of outcome should be used and what
relative levels of performance should be expected are best left to educators.
79. That there was psychological damage done to the Black victims of segregation is a questionable
proposition at best; even if it could be established, it is not clear that desegregation is an appropriate
and effective therapy.
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to them. Such an approach would not only justify traditional remedial and
compensatory programs designed to improve the quality of education, such as
those authorized in Milliken 11,8° but also provide a constitutional basis for the
more controversial and innovative approaches that have more recently appeared
in the literature.8 If these controversial measures identified the beneficiary of
the remedy in the same terms as he or she was identified for victimization, so
be it-this is the compelling governmental purpose that justifies the consideration
of race in governmental decision making. If these measures did not work
immediately to maximize integration, so be it-the remedy is tailored to the harm
accurately identified. By eliminating the dubious notion that segregation in and
of itself caused psychological and developmental harm to Black children from
the Brown decision and thus from the lexicon of desegregation discourse, policy
makers would be freed to structure remedies for state imposed segregation that
focus on the undeniable harm that was done.
This approach is not anti-integrationist. The requirement that school
systems unsegregate would put an end to active efforts to segregate the races.
Beyond that, however, the Court should have noted that integrated schools, all
other things being equal, are as a general matter superior to schools that are not
integrated. 2 Assuming that comparable schools are equal in terms of resources,
facilities, and academics, one that excludes citizens on the basis of race is
clearly inferior to one that does not. A school that operates in this pluralistic
society in a manner inconsistent with one of America's fundamental values,
equality among its citizens, cannot be equal in quality to one that does not.
While unsegregation could be required to remedy the constitutional wrong of
segregation, integration can be viewed as a quality enhancement that should be
vigorously pursued in every school, except where it interferes with other
legitimate remedial programs. Those other legitimate remedial programs might
well, in educationally appropriate circumstances, include overt racial concerns
or even segregation.83
The constitutional inequality on which the Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection violation could have been founded was in the simple fact of state
imposed segregation of the races. Segregation of the races is inherently
unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the fundamental value embodied
80. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
81. See supra notes 5, 17, 19.
82. "Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more natural basis for the education of
all youth. It gives wider contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority
complex." DuBois, supra note 1, at 328.
83. See supra notes 5, 17, 19.
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in the Equal Protection Clause.84 The Court functioning in its expository
capacity could easily have made that declaration and ordered that the practice
cease. The tangible inequality that is the result of discriminatory treatment of
Black students attending segregated schools through resource inequities and
curricular deficiencies and the general inferiority of schools that are segregated
without compelling reason must be addressed more directly than through
assumptions that integration will work its magic.
Identifying the harm of segregation both in terms of its inherent
inconsistency with the constitutional norms expressed in the Fourteenth
Amendment and in terms of its rendering ineffective the education system in
meeting equally the needs of all children, would allow the Court to fashion
remedies focused on quality improvements for African-American children, in
whatever form those improvements may take.
The question of when the remedy could be said to have been achieved
would have to be answered in terms much more difficult to measure than a
particular degree of racial balance. The remedy would be achieved when the
schools equally meet the educational needs of their African-American and
White students as measured by outcome based measures of academic
achievement.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
85. See Denise Morgan, What is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to Minimally
Adequate Education, 8 HARv. BLAcKLzrR J. 99 (1991); Betsy Levin, The Courts, Congress, and
EducationalAdequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REv. 187 (1979). 1 recognize
that there are serious concerns with regard to the utility of standardized tests to accurately measure
academic achievement particularly among minority group individuals. For purposes of this essay,
I have placed that concern on the shelf.
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